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ABSTRACT This paper addresses the notion of goal alignment in venture-backed firms. Aligning 
the goals of entrepreneurs to VCs‟ goals, and vice versa, may be the first step towards building strong 
mutual relationships between the two. Yet, little is know about the long-term outcomes of the aspects 
of these relationships as the literature todate has considered to a great extent the relationship between 
VC and entrepreneur as a „black box‟. This paper makes an attempt to half-open this „black box‟ by 
exploring the dyadic tensions between VCs and entrepreneurs in the course of de-internationalisation 
that is perceived as a negative deviation from what is normal or expected. The data emerged from a 
case study research that used critical incident technique to data collection, analysis, and interpretation. 
Grounded in data, the paper proposes the typology of goal alignment that was generated by cross-
tabulating entrepreneurs‟ and VCs‟ agendas. Four types of alignment emerged: life changing 
opportunity, enslavement, no marriage, and illusive alignment. The concept of goal alignment is 
unidirectional; it is geared towards the VCs‟ agenda of a quick exit. 
 
Keywords: venture capital, international new ventures, goal alignment, critical incident technique  
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The information and communication technology sector has played and will continue playing 
a pivotal role in transforming the economy by boosting more rapid growth and productivity 
gains (OECD, 2001; 2004). In this context, small high-technology firms are seen as engines 
of economic growth, trying to derive their profits from international activities right from their 
inception (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). At the same time, these high-growth high-
technology ventures resemble the firms usually venture capitalists (VCs) will back: they are 
small, young, and in industries characterised by high risk and uncertainty (Bloodgood et al., 
1996).  
 
The burst of the dot.com bubble demonstrated once more that businesses built around high-
technology product innovations are dramatically unstable (Slywotzky and Wise 2002). It also 
supported earlier assertions that stable growth continues to be both very rare and poorly 
understood (Vinnell and Hamilton, 1999), and that substantial growth is seemingly a rather 
exceptional process (Storey, 2002; Carter et al., 2004). For example, as Carter et al. (2004) 
found, with years in business, growth objectives of small firms decrease incrementally, while 
ambitions for closure, sale, succession or remaining the same size increase incrementally.  
 
In venture-backed firms the growth objectives of VCs on one hand and entrepreneurs on the 
other may become the source of tensions between the two (Cable and Shane, 1997; De Clercq 
and Sapienza, 2006). For example, driven by „dominant logic‟ (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995), 
VC‟s are attracted to high-growth ventures because of the potential for very high gains in 
combination with the availability of early exit strategies (Petty, 1997). On the other hand, 
entrepreneurs might want to focus on profitability via a long-term growth. The dilemma then 
for entrepreneurs is whether to agree with VCs‟ strategy that is focused on early exit or insist 
on the strategy that is long-term and profitability oriented. These divergent objectives may 
lead to disagreements over the direction of the development of the firm (Sorenson and Stuart, 
2001). 
 
The degree to which exchange partners‟ goals and values converge is referred to as goal 
congruence (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The importance of goal congruence to the success 
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of a venture has been widely acknowledged (Cable and Shane, 1997; Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 2001; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Parhankangas et al., 2005). The literature 
to date however has considered to a great extent the relationship between VC and 
entrepreneur as a „black box‟ (De Clercq and Manigart, 2007), and little is know about the 
long-term outcomes of the aspects of these relationships (Busenitz et al., 2004). 
 
This paper makes an attempt to half-open this „black box‟ by exploring the dyadic tensions 
between VCs and entrepreneurs that emerge post-investment with a specific focus on critical 
events in the course of de-internationalisation of small software companies. Grounded in 
data, the paper will propose a typology of goal alignment to explain the issues of congruence 
over ends and means in venture-backed firms. The data emerged from an exploratory case 
study research that used critical incident technique to data collection, analysis, and 





Two broad streams of research form the current enquiry into the post-investment relationship 
between entrepreneur and VC: research with focus on value added and monitoring activities 
by venture capitalists (for review, see De Clercq and Manigart, 2007). De Clercq and 
Manigart (2007) maintain that although these two types of activities overlap, their underlying 
assumptions are quite different. The research on value added focuses primarily on VCs‟ non-
financial efforts (social capital, business and legal knowledge, active participation, strategic 
information) to increase the value of their investment after the investment decision has been 
made (Manigart et al., 2002; Busenitz et al., 2004; Florin, 2005; Makela and Maula, 2005; 
Wiltbank, 2005; Berglund et al., 2007). The research on value added by VCs beyond their 
financial involvement is in its early stage (Busenitz, 2007), and its findings so far are 
somehow inconsistent (DeClerq and Manigart, 2007) and mixed (see for example, Busenitz et 
al., 2004; Florin, 2005; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). The sampling bias towards more success 
stories built in the research design is seen as one of the reasons for the inconsistency of the 
findings (Manigart et al., 2002; De Clercq and Manigart, 2007). The present research feels in 
this gap by exploring longitudinally the relationships between VCs and entrepreneurs in 
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critical situations that deviate negatively
1
 from what is normal or expected (Edvardsson, 
1992). 
 
The research on monitoring focuses on VCs‟ attempts to pre-empt and correct potential 
harmful behaviour by entrepreneurs (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; Bruton et al., 2000; 
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; Parhankangas et al., 2005). Trust and control, as Shepherd 
and Zacharakis (2001) maintain, are interrelated antecedents of confidence. VCs as well as 
entrepreneurs can build trust by engaging in frequent and open communication, signalling 
commitment and consistency, being fair and just and aligning the goals of the company 
(Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; see also Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; De Clercq and 
Sapienza, 2006). Contractual control rights are the primary means through which VCs 
address the potential for opportunism and disagreements (Barney et al., 1994; Parhankangas 
et al., 2005). Some of other common government means of VCs include: serving on a new 
venture‟s board of directors (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002; Berglund et al., 2007); frequency 
of face-to-face communication with entrepreneurs (Sapienza et al., 1996; De Clercq and 
Fried, 2005; Makela and Maula, 2005), and dismissal (Fiet et al., 1997; Bruton et al., 2000).  
 
In venture-backed firms the growth objectives of VCs and entrepreneurs may become the 
source of potential disagreement between the two. For example, VC‟s are attracted to high-
growth ventures because of the potential for very high gains in combination with the 
availability of early exit strategies (Petty, 1997). Pursuing quick exit, VCs may pressure the 
entrepreneur to seek short-term profits even to the detriment of long-term profitability. They 
are inclined to take companies public near market peaks, even if this is not necessarily the 
optimal timing for the new venture (Lerner, 1994). On the other hand, entrepreneurs might 
want to focus on profitability via a long-term growth. The dilemma then for entrepreneurs is 
whether to agree with VCs‟ strategy that is focused on early exit or insist on the strategy that 
is long-term and profitability oriented.  
 
The research also shows that VCs may seek a premature initial public offering (IPO) in their 
portfolio investments in order to gain reputation (Gompers, 1996). The research also suggests 
that VCs may refrain an entrepreneur from bringing the new venture to a next growth stage 
by under-investing in it (De Clercq and Manigart, 2007). Such allocation of capital may be 
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more detrimental for the entrepreneur than for the VC since the latter can spread the 
investment risk across multiple portfolio companies; this might lead to conflicts with the 
interests of individual portfolio firms (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005).  
 
The research on procedural justice may shed some light on goal alignment between VCs and 
entrepreneurs. Procedural justice theory is concerned with individuals‟ reactions to decisions 
in which they are personally invested but that they cannot directly or fully control (Sapienza 
and Korsgaard, 1996). That is, when a direct control over a decision is not possible, 
individuals value just procedures because they provide a means to indirect control over that 
decision. Tyler (1989) put forward three factors that determine procedural justice judgements: 
standing, neutrality, and trust. Standing denotes one‟s status in a relationship that provides an 
opportunity to speak forthrightly. The opportunity to refute someone‟s comments and defend 
one‟s point of view may indeed be beneficial for aligning each other‟s goals. Neutrality 
implies an impartial treatment with respect to other ventures in a VC‟s portfolio. VCs will 
seek best information from entrepreneurs to make decisions that affect the respective venture. 
And trust reflects an assurance of the predictability of someone else‟s actions. Research in 
this area suggests that procedural justice is an important determinant of investors‟ attitudes 
and behaviours (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996), and that it is positively associated with long-
term venture performance, which suggests that the relationship between VCs and 
entrepreneur may be well served by establishing procedures to ensure fairness and efficient 
information exchange (Busenitz et al.,  2004).  
 
In the case of high-technology new ventures, in the early stages of the rollout of a new 
technology the market signals are not reliable (Coltman et al., 2001; OECD, 2001). The need 
for strategic goal alignment becomes even more critical and more difficult to attain in such 
situations when an industry is not clearly established and lacks legitimacy (Mäkelä and 
Maula, 2005). Questions of relevant performance benchmarks arise (Lovallo and 
Kahnemann, 2003). Both entrepreneurs and VCs are learning and adjusting their behaviour as 
the industry emerges (Valliere and Peterson, 2005). As argued by Fredrickson (1984), a more 
complex or turbulent environment requires less rationality.  
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The question then is whether it is possible to establish in such uncertain environments 
procedures that ensure fairness and efficient information exchange. Can VCs for example 
stay neutral? If based on the best information available from entrepreneurs, VCs decide not to 
continue investing in production or further innovation of the product, how may entrepreneurs 
perceive such decision: just or unjust? Is it because VCs lost interest in the venture (unjust) or 
because VCs misread the signals from the market (just)? Will entrepreneurs provide VCs 
with best available information since it may be used against their venture and VCs can not 
verify it in such an uncertain environment?  
 
One might expect to observe higher tensions in entrepreneur-VC relationships in critical 
situations when there is a negative deviation from what is believed to be normal or expected. 
These high-technology companies, using venture capital, are internationalising at or right 
after their inception, and are expecting to deliver high returns to their backers. These 
expectations were not always met however. Companies for example would de-
internationalise as a result of critical incidents that were emanating either from outside or 
inside the firm. The decision over the course of action at such critical points might effect 
higher tensions between VCs and entrepreneurs. For instance, the entrepreneur would 
consider the choice between completely or partial withdrawal from a foreign market, whereas 
the VC would consider the option between further committing resources or closing the 
company down. As maintained by De Clercq and Manigart (2007), this type of goal 
congruence in terms of how autonomous the entrepreneur can be in making decisions over 
the strategic direction of the company is of a very different nature and calls for different 
action, which in turn presents a further route for fruitful research.  
 
The importance of goal congruence to the success of a venture has been widely 
acknowledged (Bruton et al., 2000; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; de Clercq and Sapienza, 
2006; Parhankangas et al., 2005), yet the literature todate has considered to a great extent the 
relationship between VC and entrepreneur as a „black box‟ (De Clercq and Manigart, 2007), 
and little is know about the long-term outcomes of the aspects of these relationships 
(Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; Busenitz et al., 2004). This paper makes an attempt to half-
open this „black box‟ by exploring the dyadic tensions between VCs and entrepreneurs that 
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emerge post-investment with a specific focus on critical events in the course of de-
internationalisation
2




For the purpose of this study, the critical incident technique (CIT) methodology was 
employed. The traditional CIT has its origins in the research undertaken by Flanagan (1954). 
On the assumption of a positivist approach to social science, he defined incident as any 
observable human activity that is sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and 
predictions to be made about the person performing the act. To be critical, Flanagan argues 
that an incident must occur in a situation where the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly 
clear to the observer and where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt 
concerning its effects. The definition of CIT has somewhat changed over the years to take 
into account changes in assumptions about ontology, methodology, and human nature. 
Taking into account the above changes, Chell (1998: 56) defined CIT as a qualitative 
interview procedure that facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, 
incidents, processes or issues) identified by respondent, the way they are managed, and the 




One of the challenges when studying critical events is to minimize the attribution errors – 
when people tend to misattribute the cause of the events (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). 
According to Lovallo and Kahneman (2003), the typical pattern of such attribution errors is 
for people to take credit for positive outcomes and to attribute negative outcomes to external 
factors, no matter what their true cause. Several sampling strategies were employed to 
minimise the effect of such attribution errors, hence to increase the construct validly of the 
research. One strategy was to control for the effect of the external environment (e.g. 
legislation, market size, market structure across industries and countries, effect of time) on 
selected cases. The firms were selected from the same location and observed during the same 
time period. The other strategy was to minimize the potential effect of resource bias; small 
being defined as a company having less than 100 employees (Storey, 1994). And the third 
was to ensure that the critical event(s) were transparently observable in all cases. E.g., for the 
purpose of the present research the firms (i) had de-internationalised, either partly or 
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completely, and (ii) were either in business or ceased trading. Four case companies were 
purposefully selected on the above identified criteria. The case companies were small, were 
operating in software sector in Scotland, received venture capital, and de-internationalised 
during 1999-2001.
4
 A fifth case was added to the research that matched all the above 
selection criteria but one: it did not raise venture capital in order to internationalise. Table 1 
provides a brief summary of the cases. For confidentiality reasons, interviewees‟ and 
companies‟ names are disguised throughout the paper. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Data collection and triangulation 
 
Data triangulation also helped minimize the attribution errors by corroborating the data 
collected from entrepreneurs via the data collected from their stakeholders and other sources 
(figure 1). The information about the critical incidents that led to de-internationalisation was 
collected primarily from three data sources: (i) secondary sources; (ii) in-depth interviews 
with companies‟ directors; and (iii) in-depth interviews with companies‟ stakeholders. 
Twenty-four interviews, including follow-ups, were conducted with company directors and 
their stakeholders, yielding approximately 150 pages of interview data. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Secondary sources of data 
 
Thorough preparations before entering the field work are pivotal especially when studying 
critical events. An opportunity to get access to an entrepreneur with such experience might be 
unique, and therefore as much as possible shall be learned about the entrepreneur and the 
company before the interview. The use of secondary data was seen then to satisfy four key 
aims. First was to detect potential cases on the bases of selection criteria. Second, to learn as 
much as possible about a company and its history prior to the actual interview with its 
director. Third, to compare and cross-check written and published evidence with what 
interview respondents reported. And fourth, to identify potential stakeholders who could 
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corroborate the consistency of information reported by interviewees. Databases were created 
for each case to organize and document data collected, thus contributing to the enhancement 
of the reliability of the research. As the research unfolded, primary data was added to the 
databases as well.  
 
Interviews with entrepreneurs 
 
To explore critical incidents in the case companies, CIT guidelines for in-depth interviewing 
were followed, namely, (i) indicate to the interviewee the authority on which the interview is 
being held; (ii) make a statement about the purpose of the study; (iii) explain why the 
interviewee has been chosen to comment; (iv) convince the interviewee of the anonymity of 
the data; (v) the main question should state that an incident or actual behaviour is desired; (vi) 
allow the interviewee to do most of the talking and avoid asking leading questions; (vii) 
control the interview, by probing the incidents and clarifying one‟s understanding; (viii) ask 
follow-up questions to ensure that a comprehensive and detailed account has been given; (ix) 
conclude the interview; and (x) take care of ethical issues (Chell, 1998; Flanagan, 1954). 
 
The interviews were conducted with entrepreneurs who were responsible for and 
implemented de-internationalisation decisions. The average interview lasted approximately 
sixty minutes. All interviews were recorded with interviewee‟s permission, and transcribed 
verbatim immediately after. The interviews were semi-structured in the form of guided 
conversations. Critical incident technique method guidelines were followed; namely, the 
interviewee was allowed to do most of the talking, leading questions were avoided, and open 
ended questions, followed by appropriately worded probing questions, were employed. To 
ensure some comparativeness between the responses, and allow sufficient control over the 
interview to ensure that the research objectives were met, an interview guide was designed. 
 
Interviews with company stakeholders 
 
The aim of interviewing companies‟ stakeholders was threefold. First, to corroborate data 
derived from the interviews with entrepreneurs. Second, to capture their own experience and 
understanding in relation to critical events such as de-internationalisation, including their 
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attitudes towards failed companies. And third, to request their help in identifying potential 
companies for the study. Chiefly, companies‟ stakeholders were represented by their 
investors, liquidators, strategic advisors, policy makers, and business correspondents. The 
average interview lasted approximately sixty minutes. All interviews were recorded with 
interviewee‟s permission and transcribed verbatim. The same approach and principles to 
design the interview guide with entrepreneurs were used to design the interview guide with 
stakeholders, including the negotiation of the getting back option of returning for further 




Once an interview was transcribed, it was transferred to QSR NVivo programme that handles 
qualitative data analysis research projects. The interview transcripts and secondary data 
pertinent to each case were coded in an iterative manner, working back and forth between 
theory, emerging patterns and data. Within- and cross-case analyses were employed to 
analyse the data. Within-case analysis was the basis for developing early constructs 
surrounding the critical events in the process of de-internationalisation, like for example 
agility and hype. The exploration and description of each case was centred on critical events 
and started from the inception of the company. A time line of critical events, an international 
path, and a time line of revenue and employment (actual and projected) were generated for 
each case. Quotes from interviews were used extensively to illustrate the events, incidents, 
processes and issues that had, to various degrees, an impact on the entrepreneurs‟ decisions to 
de-internationalise. According to Dubin (1969), the very essence of description is to name the 
properties of things, and the more adequate the description, the greater the likelihood that the 




The „de-internationalisation project‟ in NVivo was structured around a matrix format that 
represents the list of events for each case (Miles and Huberman, 1994). According to Miles 
and Huberman (1994), this approach to within-data analysis allows a good look at what led to 
what, when and why. The content of the „event listing‟ matrix emerged after the initial „free 
coding‟ or open coding (Glaser, 1978) for each case was completed, and each case was 
explored and described in detail using the event listing matrix. The matrix mapped the 
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historical chronological flow of critical events in the course of de-internationalisation process 
starting from the inception of a new venture or new business idea, and finishing beyond 
unthinkable, a hindsight reflection of entrepreneurs‟ de-internationalisation experiences. A 
total of four distinct time periods emerged while free coding the data; these were emergence 
of international new business idea, international expansion, at a critical juncture, and beyond 
it. A set of categories that dealt with the locale of events (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was 
defined for different levels: entrepreneur, firm, home market, and international market. The 
summary of critical events in the case companies is presented in table 2. Appendixes 1 and 2 
illustrate the matrix concept adopted in the process of data analysis; with open coding being 
freely observable in appendix 2. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Next step was to undertake a cross-case analysis by focusing on similarities and differences 
between the cases. For example, as shown in Table 1, negative deviation from what is 
expected, in this case de-internationalisation, is transparently observable. In terms of success 
of de-internationalisation efforts, Finance-Software and Tool-Software together, and Mobile-
Software and Data-Software together represent polar types.
6
 Project-Software, as a Phoenix 
company, represents a case of failure and success at the same time. In Finance-Software and 
Tool-Software, the process of entrepreneurial de-internationalisation is observable. Middle-
range theorising helped to manage the complexity of the emergent process of de-
internationalisation, and related critical incidents by moving from open to selective coding. 
According to Weick (1989: 521), middle-range theories are solutions to problems that contain 
a limited number of assumptions and considerable accuracy and detail in the problem 
specification. The method of constructing typologies by reduction (Glaser, 1978) was 
employed to advance middle-range theory of dyadic tensions between entrepreneur and VCs. 
Grounded in data, figure 2 presents the typology of goal alignment that was generated by 
cross-tabulating entrepreneurs‟ agenda and VCs‟ agenda. Four types of alignment emerged: 
life changing opportunity (quadrant I); enslavement (quadrant II); no marriage (quadrant III); 
and illusive alignment (IV). The concept of goal alignment is unidirectional; it is geared 
towards the VCs‟ agenda of a quick exit. Next section will discuss the typology in detail. 
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Figure 2 about here 
 
Typology of goal alignment 
 
Dyadic tensions at inception  
 
Regardless of what business model and growth path a firm adopts in its efforts to develop and 
market its product, it faces three generic questions with regards to internationalisation: how 
fast to internationalise, what entry mode to adopt, and what market to target. To the above, 
VC backed firms, before addressing the above strategic issues, have to alleviate the tensions 
that might appear as the result of differences in the entrepreneurs‟ and the VCs‟ goals. For 
example, on one side, entrepreneurs want to achieve profitability via long-term growth, 
whereas VCs‟ goals are to exit quickly. The dilemma then is whether to focus on long-term 
growth or early exit strategy. As several interviewees explained:  
‘VCs’ nature is that they need an exit point. This is how they make their 
money – only on the exits. Therefore it is not good to them to have a 
management team that wants to build a perfect company over 20 years’ – the 
liquidator; 
 
‘VCs want out as fast as they can. The minute they buy your share, their only 
concern is whom they are going to sell their shares to. Short-term profit is not 
a priority item. It does not matter at all. These are the dippiest, darkest secrets 
of the VC world’ – the business strategy consultant.   
 
The data further suggests that VCs agenda is driven by the life cycle of their investment 
portfolio. By and large, VCs will raise a ten year fund. By year three VCs will invest the 
money, by year seven they would be looking to get the returns, and by year ten they would 
have exited from all the portfolios, and returned funds to their investors. That imposes 
pressure on entrepreneurs to conform to that sort of cycle.  
 
This dominant logic (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995) shapes VCs behaviour in that they can 
refrain an entrepreneur from bringing the company to a next growth stage for example by 
under-investing and redirecting their efforts to the „absolute stars‟ (see also, Mäkelä and 
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Maula, 2005). The success rate of the portfolio also plays a crucial role in setting up VCs 
agenda. As one VC explained:  
‘We have a target to invest from 15 to 20 million pounds a year. …The 
success rate on average is three out of ten are absolute stars: you give the 
business plan, and they completely deliver that. Then, we would see one or 
two out of ten would go bust; and the balance is somewhere in the middle’ – 
the venture capitalist. 
 
Hence, as venture capital comes in, it pushes the growth forward, and it starts to climb the 
value curve. The ideal time for VCs to exit is when the internal rate of return that measures 
the investment retirement is at its highest value; usually within three or five years after the 
investment was made. It follows therefore that within a maximum of three to five years from 
an investment, VCs will look to exit.  
 
The ideal situation for VCs and entrepreneurs is when their agendas are aligned, and this 
creates a life changing opportunity attitude so that entrepreneurs share the VCs‟ desire for a 
quick exit (quadrant I, figure 2). These days, when according to one VC „…the number of 
deals are low, and doing deals becomes harder‟, it is even more crucial to create that life 
changing opportunity attitude so that management teams share VCs‟ desire for exit. As 
several interviewees explained: 
‘An interesting perspective emerges whereby VCs want management’s 
objectives aligned in terms of exits. It is critical to them that the management 
team has a life changing opportunity for themselves, because VCs absolutely 
have to go in and to go out. That is something that VCs currently think about. 
But I believe this tension will always be there – human nature’ – the 
liquidator. 
 
‘It really occurred to us: when we said to the investors that we were thinking 
of setting up in the US, the fact of the matter was that their perception 
immediately changed. A lot of perceived problems disappeared’ – the CEO of 
Tool-Software. 
 
As expected, some entrepreneurs just do not want to sell their company, or accept VCs‟ 
agenda. And if, as a result, no compromise is reached, then there will be no marriage between 
the two (quadrant III, figure 2). As one VC explained:  
‘When companies are coming to us with a wrong model, we may question 
them, query them, they may change it. But if they have different view from 
ours, we probably will not invest’ – the venture capitalist. 
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The data analysis further suggests that entrepreneurs however might be kept in the dark with 
regard to the VCs‟ true agenda (quadrant IV, figure 2). That is, VCs do not have to even 
insist on their objective of quick exit as entrepreneurs unknowingly and maybe reflexively, 
“share” VCs‟ exit agenda; for example, driven by hype that is exaggerated expectations about 
future sales and profits. According to the CEO of Data-Software:  
‘There was no question of not going ahead as fast as we possibly could. We 
made commitments of what we need to achieve. And in order to do that, we 
had to use the money in the way that we said that we would. That leads to 
pressure to do things, rather not to do things. Sometimes the right thing is to 
wait. But when you made commitment, it is very difficult to turn it around’ – 
the CEO of Data-Software. 
 
When asked about the possible effect of VCs desire of quick exit on the performance of the 
company, the CEO of Data-Software was surprised to hear that VCs might even have this 
agenda: 
‘Do VCs want to exit quickly? I do not think that is true. We did not have any 
VC that was pressurising for a short-term exit. They wanted us to grab the 
opportunity and maximise the value of the investment. Maybe some naïve 
entrepreneurs who are new comers to the game may believe in this’ – the 
CEO of Data-Software. 
 
Interestingly though, two years after the start-up, the CEO of Data-Software mentioned with 
regard to exit: „I expect to float the company at the right time. But I am in no rush’. It is not 
clear however, whether he had this vision at the initial round of funding, or if it emerged two 
years after as a result of successful growth; over time entrepreneurs‟ views, believes, and 
values might change and converge with those of VCs. In the same vein, VCs were trying to 
learn and adjust their behaviours as the new industries were emerging. As one of the venture 
capitalist explained: 
‘Businesses that we typically backed were businesses which needed to sell 
internationally. It turned out that the world market was a lot smaller than 
entrepreneurs forecasted. If you go back to late nineties, the market was 
extremely bullish, and investors were willing to take very large risks, and also 
had an inflated idea of what companies might be worth. The big thing that 
we’ve been working on quite hard to improve for the last years was to get real 
views on the size and trends of the markets’ – the venture capitalist. 
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In this situation of illusive alignment of goals (quadrant IV, figure 2), for VCs it is easier to 
mitigate the effect of getting an investment, which is when entrepreneurs „lose control‟ 
having actually retained the majority of the shares, by making entrepreneurs believe they are 
in control of the situation as long as they unknowingly and reflexively advocate VCs‟ agenda. 
As several interviewees noted: 
‘The day entrepreneurs get venture capital, they lose control, because VCs are 
using shareholders agreement/contract that goes outside share earnings to 
have rights to do things and to stop things firmly in the house. They have 
rights to positive and negative control, i.e. to do anything serious they have to 
do in spite of the board’ – the business strategy consultant;  
 
‘There is a side effect of taking VC money. In my experience VCs do want 
control. They want to exert control over the things that are not working. 
Typically VCs will invest in the business and the management team that is 
there. By and large they will leave it alone, if it works’ – the liquidator. 
 
Entrepreneurs find themselves enslaved (quadrant II, figure 2) when they are trying to sell to 
the VCs their own vision of strategic growth, but VCs disagree and impose their own growth 
strategy. As entrepreneurs explained: 
‘Our original pitch was to stay in the UK, get sufficient knowledge of the sales 
process, and then go to the US. At the very first meeting with our investors 
they said that this was a daft strategy; the vast majority of the IT sales is in the 
US, therefore you should be in the US straight away. Change your plan. So, 
we changed the plan, otherwise we would not get the investment’ – the CEO 
of Project-Software. 
 
‘We had to construct the business plan so that it would give VCs the rates of 
return to buy them into. So, we had to construct something that would say that 
we could do it for £9 million, although we needed £18 million. In the end we 
received £6 million only…and all this backfired. At the board meeting we 
raised the issue whether our ambitious plans should be cut in line with the 
reduced funds, to which investors said that the plan should be executed as 
stated in the business plan’ – the CEO of Mobile-Software. 
 
 
To the above differences in the views over the foreign market entry strategies, the marketing 
non-executive director, whom Project-Software hired, insisted on selling the product into 
Europe via a master distributor – a strategy that was never supported by co-founders, but that 
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was eventually adopted by them to avoid the conflict with the investors. The CEO of Project-
Software clarified the situation: 
‘Ok, ultimately we felt it was sensible to go to the US, but we felt it was not 
sensible at all to go to Europe so early. VCs, unfortunately, sided very much 
with our non-executive’s suggestions. I remember us feeling an intense 
pressure to agree to do this, although our personal intuition was that this was 
wrong thing to do. …It is very hard to stand up and say no, that is not 
sensible, we are going to do the opposite. Because, then you are in conflict 
with your investors’ – the CEO of Project-Software.  
 
For entrepreneurs this is a catch-22 situation: they can not or do not want to say „no‟ as they 
for example (i) are desperate to get funding in order to develop and/or market their product, 
or (ii) lack sufficient knowledge and experience to argue their case, or (iii) are trying to avoid 
the situation when they could be blamed for the firm‟s failure when things go wrong. As the 
CEO of Project-Software explained: 
‘If we did not carry the strategy through, it could backfire and looked like it 
was our fault and we did not achieve the sales that we hoped we would. And of 
course we could then have had a difficult argument to make because it would 
be hard to justify that our decision was right when every one else felt it was 
wrong’ – the CEO of Project-Software. 
 
By saying „yes‟ to something they do not agree with, i.e. by enslavement (quadrant II, figure 
2), entrepreneurs force themselves into a conflict situation, which they have to live with for 
the remainder of their marriage with VCs. As the CEO of Project-Software noted: 
‘We felt incredibly frustrated, stressful. This conflict gives you a sense that 
you’ve lost control of something that you used to view as yours. We lost 
control of the pace, as the investors dictated the pace of the growth… I think 
they were stifling the growth of our company, rather than helping it grow’ – 
the CEO of Project-Software. 
 
If a consensus is not found to alleviate these dyadic tensions as quickly as possible, 
dissatisfaction with the deal will continue amplifying, and will inevitably lead to a divorce. In 
the case of internationalised firms, the enslavement may lead to de-internationalisation or any 
other critical events.  
 
Dyadic tensions at critical juncture  
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Once internationalised, the questions that most need to be addressed by entrepreneurs are: to 
what extent is the chosen internationalisation strategy continuing to deliver returns and 
positive performance, and if less than optimal, what change would better effect attainment of 
projected targets (Turcan, 2003). In VC backed firms the ability to make the change happen 
in the light of negative feedback depends on how agile entrepreneurs are in their decision 
making process. Agility was a recurrent pattern throughout the data analysis (table 3). 
Grounded in data, agility is about flexible decision making and a flexible cost base structure 
that allow decision makers (entrepreneurs and VCs) to scale up and more importantly to scale 
down according to the activity level that the firm is experiencing. The data analysis suggests 
that the degree of goal alignment would determine the extent of agility. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
For example, the co-founders of Project-Software, who were enslaved (quadrant II, figure 2,) 
and who were in conflict with their investors (who imposed a lot of decisions upon them, and 
with which co-founders did not agree), had the perception that they not only lost control of 
the company and their agility in decision making, but also that „VCs were stifling the growth 
of the company, rather than helping it to grow‟. It all started when VCs conditioned their 
participation in the venture by asking the co-founders to change their business plan that, as 
one of the co-founders put it, ‘… did not look ambitious enough’. Continuous commitments 
of resources to that ambitious plan during the downturn in the IT market, as well as the 
cumbersome decision making process, had the same effect on co-founders‟ perceptions of 
VCs‟ and their role to the company performance. As the CEO of Project-Software recalled: 
‘Our sales projections were too ambitious… otherwise we would not get the 
investment in the first place. When our sales stopped, we were still making 
trips to the US, which... was mad. …we took the investment we lost control of 
the company and our ability to proactively track the reality of the situation 
and make quick decisions. The decisions we had to make had run passed 
various people and convince them that this was the right one. Sometimes it is 
useful to justify things, but we felt we were not as responsive as we had been 
prior to that, and as we are now’ – the CEO of Project-Software. 
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In the case of Data-Software, although there was an elusive alignment of co-founders‟ goals 
to VCs‟ goals, it did not prevent the VCs letting the lead entrepreneur go, when he suggested 
a growth path, which was different from the VCs‟ one. As he explained: 
‘The VCs did let us manage the company. No complaints about that 
whatsoever. They supported the company. The chairman’s job was to make 
sure that we delivered to VCs our promises, and VCs had a confidence in the 
chairman. We developed and changed the plans… you learn as you go. VCs 
always said yes, until we suggested going down a different route… they 
brought in another CEO’ – the CEO of Data-Software. 
 
According to a business strategy consultant, „more often than not VCs are not agile‟. Failure 
to scale down however may lead to escalating situations that are the effects of repeated 
decision making in the face of negative feedback about prior resource allocations, 
uncertainty, surrounding the likelihood of goal attainment, and choice about whether to 
continue (Brockner, 1992). Entrepreneurs who had VC backing exhibited this kind of 
behaviour, escalated their commitment to the failing course of action. Despite the fact that in 
the second half of 2000 the IT market in the US started to collapse and that the same started 
happening in the UK one year later, the entrepreneurs got trapped in, what in hindsight was 
to become, a failing course of action and kept committing resources.  
 
For example, co-founders of Project-Software, being in a conflict with their investors 
continued investing organisational resources trying to boost sales in the diminishing US 
market in order to meet the projected targets. Co-founders of Data-Software having their 
growth strategy aligned to VCs‟ strategy, i.e. to develop the company as fast as possible 
(albeit without being aware of VCs‟ ultimate exit objectives) continued this strategy and 
opened another two overseas offices, and were making plans to double the workforce over 
the next year. As co-founders of these firms stated: 
‘When in 2000 things started to go wrong in the US, our sales stopped, but we 
were still making trips, because we invested a lot of money to go there, and 
time and effort… We were becoming increasingly desperate to get sales from 
there, and we were under a lot of pressure as we were not meeting the sales 
targets’ – the CEO of Project-Software; 
 
‘To raise money we had to make commitments of what we would need to 
achieve. Once we got the money we had to use them in the way we said we 
would. That leads to pressure to do things, rather than not to do things… the 
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pressure was to invest to build the company as fast as we planned. Sometimes 
the right thing is to wait. But when you made commitment, it is very difficult to 
turn it around’ – the CEO of Data-Software. 
 
As in the case of Project-Software, co-founders of Data-Software and their investors agreed 
on the strategy. However, they could not agree on the implementation side of it. The 
stumbling-block was their strategic partner, one of the largest software companies, who had 
announced earlier that they would develop, on their own, a similar product. The co-founders 
suggested a continued focus on product development, but a switch to direct selling, as the 
lead entrepreneur recalled: 
‘I would have focused on the higher value added product that [our strategic 
partner] would not develop; and in order to deal with economic external 
factors, pull out, retract, maybe trying to keep foot in US on a smaller basis, 
because this is where the lead market is for that technology’ – the CEO of 
Data-Software. 
 
The investors, however, „…spooked by the intentions of the strategic partner‟ – as the lead 
entrepreneur described the situation, disagreed and decided to pull completely out of the US 
and focus on applications instead. The lead entrepreneur left and a new CEO was brought in 
to implement the VCs‟ survival strategy. The new CEO failed, however, to save the company 
either through a refinancing or sale, and Data-Software was put up for voluntary liquidation. 
In autumn of 2001, Data-Software ceased trading. In the same vain, Busenitz et al. (2004) 
found that a dismissal of an entrepreneur or the entire team by a VC is negatively related to 
the performance of the venture exits. Had the passion and knowledge of the lead entrepreneur 
been preserved (Cusumano (2004), things might have been different as their then strategic 




According to a business strategy consultant, „…the strongest company is the one which forms 
the best relationships with its investors‟. In the same vein, Bygrave and Timmons (1991) 
argue that the ongoing cooperative relationship between entrepreneurs and VCs is more 
important to the performance of ventures than the provision of venture capital itself. Cable 
and Shane (1997) ten years later demonstrated that the cooperation between entrepreneurs 
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and VCs is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the successful post-investment 
performance of VC backed start-ups. Therefore, aligning the goals of entrepreneurs to VCs‟ 
goals, and vice versa, may be the first step towards building those strong mutual 
relationships. To understand these dyadic relationships between entrepreneurs‟ and VCs‟ 
goals, the typology of goal alignment was introduced that is unidirectional and geared 
towards the VCs‟ agenda of quick exit. Four types of goal alignment emerged (see figure 2): 
(i) life changing opportunity; (ii) enslavement; (iii) no marriage; and (iv) illusive alignment. 
 
The ideal situation for VCs and entrepreneurs is when their agendas are aligned, and this 
creates a life changing opportunity attitude so that entrepreneurs share the VCs‟ desire for a 
quick exit. This life changing opportunity attitude is based on the assumption that what is 
good for VC is good for entrepreneur; an assumption that shall be treated with cautiousness 
and from time to time questioned. For example, Florin (2005) studied the effects of venture 
capital on founders‟ returns beyond an IPO. He found that entrepreneurs who share VCs 
vision of taking their ventures into high-growth path through an IPO will be better rewarded 
in terms of personal wealth if they avoid high levels of VCs involvement. Also, with high 
level of VC involvement, the likelihood of remaining as CEOs after IPO is low. This 
difference in expectations over future rewards and career may create tensions down the line 
between VCs and entrepreneurs.   
 
The goal congruence over the growth objectives of the venture at the start-up is not enough, 
as the data further suggests, to ensure life changing opportunity behaviour from entrepreneurs 
and to avoid tensions with their backers. For example, there might be a consensus over the 
goals of the portfolio company. However, VCs and entrepreneurs may disagree on the ways 
and directions of the efforts of achieving them. Sapienza and Gupta (1994) termed this type 
of agency problem as good faith disagreements. They argue that in emerging industries the 
signals from the markets regarding the best course of action are generally weak and VCs tend 
to question CEO‟s efforts to prioritise the operating goals. Hence not only an agreement over 
the goals of the venture is critical, but also over the ways of getting there. 
 
Over time, as learning curve improves, VCs‟ and entrepreneurs‟ goals might converge 
(Sheppard and Sherman, 1998) and dominant logic (re-)established (Bettis and Prahalad, 
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1995). Bettis and Prahalad (1995) warn however, that the dominant logic changes slowly and 
rarely in the absence of a crisis; in case of a crisis it tends to depart. As the case of Data-
Software suggests, the dominant logic changed in the moment of crisis „…VCs always said 
yes, until we suggested going down a different route‟ that led to dismissal of the founder CEO 
and eventual liquidation of the company.  
 
Entrepreneurs may be however kept in the dark with regard to the VCs‟ true agenda and will 
follow it believing their goals coincide with VCs goals; this is a situation of an illusive 
alignment. In this situation, VCs do not have to even insist on their objective of early exit as 
entrepreneurs unknowingly and maybe reflexively, for example, driven by hype, “share” 
VCs‟ desire for quick exit. In this situation of illusive alignment of goals, for VCs it is easier 
to mitigate the effect of getting an investment, which is when entrepreneurs „lose control‟ 
having actually retained the majority of the shares, by making entrepreneurs believe they are 
in control of the situation as long as they unknowingly and reflexively advocate the VCs‟ 
agenda.  
 
The construct of illusive alignment of goals addresses earlier criticism (Cable and Shane, 
1997) and extends extant research in that it allows incorporating the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour by VC, i.e. viewing VC as agent. In this regard, the findings by 
McKaskill et al. (2004) are quite interesting. In their quest to develop an exit readiness index, 
they found that nearly two-thirds of Australian investors and 60% of US investors do not 
clearly indicate their exit preferences. This, according to McKaskill et al. (2004), introduces 
inefficiencies and confusion on the part of the firms seeking equity.  
 
When VCs and entrepreneurs do not reach a compromise over the goals and strategies of a 
portfolio company, then there will be no marriage between the two. However, entrepreneurs 
find themselves enslaved when they can not or do not want to say „no‟ to VCs agenda as they 
for example are desperate to get funding in order to develop and/or market their product, or 
lack sufficient knowledge and experience to argue their case, or are trying to avoid the 
situation where they could be blamed for the firm‟s failure when things go wrong. 
Entrepreneurs may find themselves in a catch-22 situation. By saying „yes‟ to something they 
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do not agree with, i.e. by enslavement, entrepreneurs force themselves into a conflict 
situation, which they then have to live with for the remainder of their marriage to VCs. 
 
The enslavement construct is based on the assumption that there should be at least some sort 
of good-faith agreement between VCs and entrepreneurs; otherwise there will be no 
marriage. As the case of Project-Software indicates, founding entrepreneurs and VCs had 
similar views on the need to enter the US market; however, they held different views on 
when they should enter the EU market. VCs insisted on entering EU market at same time as 
entering the US market; founding entrepreneurs regarded the entry to the EU market as 
premature step and favoured more incremental approach to internationalisation. The effect of 
entering US and EU markets simultaneously proved to be fatal for the portfolio company. 
Similar findings could be found in Mäkelä and Maula (2005) who found that by exerting 
isomorphic pressure on entrepreneurs, VCs were driving the portfolio company to 
internationalise to „incorrect‟ markets (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; original emphasis, p. 240).  
 
 
Future research directions 
 
The typology of goal alignment poses interesting questions for future research. For example, 
the importance of creating a life changing opportunity culture could be assessed by the value 
of the exit. That is, what would be the effect of the alignment of entrepreneurs‟ objectives in 
terms of exit at the initial round of funding on the value of the exit? Or, what would be the 
value of exit when the entrepreneurs‟ objectives converge gradually with VCs‟ objectives 
during their marriage? Hence, the following proposition for future research: 
P1: Higher value at exit would be achieved in those firms where the 
entrepreneurs’ objectives were aligned, in terms of exit, from the initial round 
of funding.  
  
When entrepreneurs and VCs do not arrive at a consensus and as a result there is no 
marriage, researchers may delve into the effects of denial of funds. That is, what happens to 
the firms that were denied funding to pursue the identified new economic activities? Will 
they pursue other avenues for funding, give up and grow organically or fail? For example, 
Tool-Software was unsuccessful in raising capital just two years after a new business 
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opportunity was identified, and continued to pursue the organic growth path. Crucial in this 
process of pursing other avenues for funding is the stigma associated with failure to secure 
first round funding (see for example Cope et al., 2004). The issue of stigma of failure 
becomes even more acute in countries like Scotland, in which all the sample firms started 
their activities, where the VCs‟ community and the advisors‟ community are very small, and 
susceptible to collusion.  
 
As the concept of goal alignment is unidirectional, that is, it is geared towards the VCs‟ 
agenda of quick exit, it might be expected that the ultimate bargaining power over decision 
making process will reside with the investors. Hence, the goal alignment gives scope to 
negotiated autonomy – a negotiated freedom to make and implement decisions. As De Clercq 
and Manigart (2007) posit, possible goal conflict between the VC and entrepreneur may 
pertain more to how autonomous the entrepreneur can be in terms of the strategic direction in 
which the portfolio company is going. Hence,  
P2: In firms that acquire venture capital the level of autonomy will depend on 
the degree of alignment of goals between VCs and entrepreneurs.  
 
When VCs‟ and entrepreneurs‟ agendas are aligned, it might be inferred that entrepreneurs 
will have a higher degree of negotiated autonomy, will be more entrepreneurially oriented, 
and thus achieve higher performance, relative to the situations when the alignment of 
entrepreneurs‟ goals to VCs‟ goals is not explicit (enslavement or illusive alignment). This 
leads to the following propositions:  
P3: Firms in which VCs’ and entrepreneurs’ agendas are aligned have a 
higher degree of negotiated autonomy relative to firms in which such 
alignment is not present or explicitly stated.  
 
P4. Firms with a higher degree of negotiated autonomy will be more 
entrepreneurially oriented, and therefore will achieve higher performance. 
 
In companies with no venture capital and who opt for organic growth, one might expect that 
entrepreneurs will have a true autonomy – a complete freedom to make key decisions, and 
implement them. Finance-Software and Tool-Software are good examples of 
entrepreneurially oriented companies with true autonomy. For Finance-Software, de-
internationalisation was not just a U-turn along organisational strategy, but a U-turn along the 
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dimension of searching for new opportunity to undertake a new entry. For Tool-Software, de-
internationalisation was along a dimension searching for new opportunity and organisational 
strategy. And these entrepreneurial processes, in some instances even being radical 
departures from existing state of affairs, were possible only when entrepreneurs pursued new 
entries via organic growth, i.e. having true autonomy over their decision making process. 
Contrasting the performance of firms that adopt an organic growth with those that receive 
venture capital and in which VCs‟ and entrepreneurs‟ goals are aligned represents further 
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 Sometimes this negative deviation could be a matter of perception. The perception of failure varies 
across cultures, and legal environments. For example, in the US, a buy out of a small firm by a large 
corporation is viewed as an exit strategy (Westphal, 1999), whereas in Germany a merger with 
another company is perceived as a failure (Achtenhagen, 2002). 
 
2
 De-internationalisation can take the form of either completely or partially withdrawing from a 
foreign market. In the latter scenario, a firm can either reduce foreign operations in that market, or 
switch to entry modes that entail a lesser commitment of resources. As regards the exit modes, a 
firm may decide to de-invest, de-franchise, or de-export. De-investment can be achieved through 
franchising, contracting-out, selling-out, leverage buy-out, spin-off, or asset-swap. From franchising 
a firm may switch, for example, to exporting; and from exporting to inward-activities, importing, 
licensing-in, or R&D contracting. For review of de-internationalisation literature, see Benito and 
Welch (1999), Turcan (2003). 
 
3 Examples of employing critical incident technique could be found in organisational studies (see e.g., 
Butler, 1991) as well as in entrepreneurial studies (see e.g., Chell and Pittaway, 1998; Kaulio, 2003; 
Harrison and Mason, 2004). 
 
4 The 1999 – 2001 time period is of greater interest because in those days one could witness a hyper 
growth of information and communication technology sector whose overall revenue growth peaked 
in 2000, then rapidly declined over the following year with the bursting of the dot.com bubble, and 
afterward remained essentially flat until 2003 (Coltman et al., 2001). Software sector was chosen 
specifically for its pivotal role it played and continues to play in transforming the economy by 
boosting more rapid growth and productivity gains (OECD, 2004). 
 
5 Due to space limitations, time lines of events for each case, as well as interview protocols, data 
meta-matrices and other non-confidential data are available upon request.   
 
6
 From the point of view of the researcher, the fact that half of the firms studied had ceased to exist as 
small independent firms was disappointing. However, drawing on Storey‟s estimates of small firm 
survival after three years (Storey, 1994), it is not surprising and highlights the challenge of 
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- The typology of goal alignment is unidirectional; it is geared towards the VCs‟ agenda of a quick 
exit. 
- +:+ (QI) – indicates the situation when VCs and entrepreneurs goals are aligned and there is a goal 
congruence between the two 
- +:- (QII) – represents a situation when entrepreneurs perceive the deal as being unfair or unjust, but 
accept it as they are desperate, for one reason or another, to get funding 
- -:- (QIII) – there is a goal incongruence between VC and entrepreneur and the two depart  
- -:+ (QIV) – it is when a VC acts as an agent and does not make her intentions explicit, but an 














































B2B platforms for 
financial service 
industry 
1996 MBO 1998 0  1999 Total withdrawal from 
international activities, and yet, 
in business: NVI development 
Project-
Software 
Tools to estimate 
project costs 
1992 Start-up 1995 2 1999 
2000 
2001 Phoenix company: was 




Tools to simulate and 
test smart-cards 





Partial withdrawal from 




Platform to integrate 
mobile workforce 
data to the HQ 
2000 Start-up 2000 0 2001 2002 Total withdrawal from 
international activities, but 




Data warehouse to 
convert data into 
information 
1998 Spin-out 1998 0 2000 
2001 
2001 Total withdrawal from 
international activities, but 
ceased trading after de-
internationalisation 
 
† The reference point to calculate the internationalisation gap is the emergence of the international new venture idea (INVI): internationalisation gap of 0 years will 






Table 2. Summary of critical events in the case companies  
 
Cases Emergence of INVI International expansion At critical juncture And beyond it 
Finance-
Software 
While working for the parent company, 
we had a number of approaches from 
external organizations to see if we 
could do some work for them. 
The parent company announced that it 
wanted to reduce the overall headcount 
in its overseas R&D unit. 
We bought-out the R&D lab and 
immediately went international  
The opportunity we identified was not 
longer in demand 
We realised that we were operating 
without any focus and started incurring 
losses 
Services did not travel; we need a 
classic USP, a product 
 
Employing bottom-up approach, we 
identified new market opportunities 
Key issues were whom to partner with 
and which vertical to go 
We focused entirely on the UK market 
and grew very rapidly 
Launched the first version of the 
product 
We found that our product was at least 
12 months too early 
We decided to reduce the costs of the 
company down to the point where we 
can keep it going forever, and in doing 
that we own the IP 
Project-
Software 
Consulting on object technology, we 
realised that there were no automated 
mechanisms, and thought it would be 
really nice to have a product that did 
this 
We started R&D activities and 
launched the first version of the 
product via a deal with an OEM 
The OEM deal was short-lived 
We managed to gain control of the 
product, re-brand it, and started own 
sales 
Pitched to VCs to raise funds to market 
the product in the UK, maybe to 
Europe 
VCs said this was a daft strategy, asked 
to change the plan to reflect immediate 
international expansion to US because 
the vast majority of IT sales were in US  
We started exporting to US 
IT market stated to collapse, but we 
continued exporting 
We received second round, and 
abandoned hopes for Europe 
VCs appointed a non-exec specialised 
in crisis management 
We signed a joint venture deal with a 
large UK MNE that had a large 
customer base 
We developed a plan to cocoon and 
presented it to the investors 
The plan was not accepted by one 
investor 
We approached the liquidator to 
surrender 
We bought over the IP form the 
liquidator, re-branded it, and launched 




After wining a service project in smart-
card technology and successfully 
delivering it, we were left with the 
software, and we decided to create a 
tool 
We launched the first version of the 
tool via an OEM and took it to Europe 
We tried to raise venture capital, but 
with no success 
 
Smart-card technology started being 
adopted globally 
We took our product to US, and opened 
our first office over there   
We moved to profitability 
We won a strategic contract with one 
of the largest software player in the 
world 
The recession of the IT market started 
Our strategic partner withdrew from 
the smart-card market, and from our 
strategic partnership 
We realised that the opportunity we 
were pursuing was not realizing 
We laid-off half of staff, and 
restructured the overseas offices, and 
decided to focus back on 2G tools and 
services business to generate tactical 
revenue 
We spotted new opportunity to develop 
a 3G smart-card platform for telecom 
and finance sectors 
We received first round of funding to 
develop the platform, followed soon 
after by the second round of funding 
We expanded to Japan where we 
opened our second overseas office 
When we received third round of 




Cases Emergence of INVI International expansion At critical juncture And beyond it 
Mobile-
Software 
By providing middleware and 
application that link stock management 
or manufacturing systems to hand-held 
devices, we realised that there might be 
a business there in creating a platform 
We decided to partner with no one – it 
was a trade-off 
In order to enter enterprise space we 
had to be perceived as European and 
not UK player 
Backed by personal funding, we 
internationalized instantly via 
acquisitions; we acquired software 
vendors in Europe, UK, and Middle 
East 
Acquisition of existing customer base 
and products gave us some revenues 
However, acquired development, sales 
and marketing skills were not good at 
all 
We required additional funding to 
complete a phased design, development 
and release plan for the platform 
IT market in the US started to collapse 
We hyped the business plan to buy the 
investors into 
We opened first offices in Europe, 
Middle East, and Far East 
Secured first round of funding, 
however we received only one third 
less than hyped 
We held the board meeting with the 
investors to re-evaluate the business 
plan: no changes were made 
IT market started to worsen in the UK 
We were behind planned revenues and 
with the development of the platform 
We held next board meeting and 
decided to raise another £9 million 
One investor pulled-out from the deal, 
another was acquired by another, larger 
investor and also pulled-out 
We could not find another investors, 




Through consulting services, we 
developed IP as to how to make the 
process of data mining rapid 
Backed-up by VCs we bought-out that 
IP and small R&D team from a large 
software company 
International dimension was forced 
upon us from the very beginning, and 
we started exploring various routes to 
US market 
Failed to secure a strategic partnership 
with one of the leading companies in 
the field 
Soon after the start-up, we achieved 
brake through in product development 
After another failure to secure a 
strategic partnership with a market 
leader in business intelligence, finally 
we managed to secure a strategic 
partnership with one of the largest 
software companies 
We received 2nd round of funding to 
build sales infrastructures in the US 
We opened first two overseas sales 
office in the US close to our strategic 
partner 
IT market in the US started to collapse 
I refuted several offers from trade 
buyers 
Our strategic partner announced market 
development plans that overlapped 
with ours, and spooked by that event, 
VCs started thinking and talking as to 
what to do 
Meantime we opened another two sales 
offices in the US, and adhered to the 
strategy of fast, out-and-out growth 
IT market started to worsen in the UK 
Decision was reached to focus on 
profitability rather than on out-and-out 
growth 
It was also decided to withdraw from 
the US, and focus on applications 
rather than products, and on direct 
selling in UK only 
I stepped down, and VCs brought in 
new CEO to effect new strategy 
New CEO could not attract new 












…ability to grow and shrink; …have a flexible structure; have 




…ability to make decisions very rapidly; …ability to change 




…being ready to adapt and change; …being ready to act and take 




…ability to change directions quickly, and bring everybody with you. 
Strategy consultant Agility has to be at every level of the business. 
Liquidator 
…ability to scale up or more importantly to scale down quickly; 
…keep the cost base flexible; …being free to make decisions, not 
































Appendix 2. Event list matrix: en example of open coding  
 
 
